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I. Abstract defamation law, an opinion is a defense to 
The Supreme Court has established a defamation. The third obstacle they face is 
test for determining which label applies to that they cannot sue the Internet service 
each individual plaintiff, but this test was provider, which is provided immunity under 
developed in 1974, in the context of Section 230 of the Communications 
newspapers and physical print. A new test Decency Act (CDA). Since the CDA was 
is needed in the context of the Internet. first enacted in 1996, the need to encourage 
Libel is of interest in the age of the Internet growth and development of Internet service 
since blog posts, Instagram posts, Facebook providers no longer exists in the same way 
posts, etc. are, for the most part, written that it did at that time. As a result, 
statements (videos posted on such providers defamation law needs to be updated to 
can also be oral, so slander could also be of provide recourse and protection for those 
issue). There is a different standard for whose reputation is damaged on the Internet. 
proving defamation cases if the plaintiff is a This note will discuss the challenges facing 
private individual versus a public figure, a Internet personas under current defamation 
limited public figure, or a public official. law by way of example. To illustrate the 
Today, Internet personas face challenges challenges Internet personas face in a legal 
when faced with cyberbullying by Internet action, this note will explore obstacles that 
trolls. The first obstacle for social media two fashion bloggers, Chiara Ferragni of 
providers is determining whether they "The Blonde Salad" and Leandra Medine of 
qualify as a public figure, a limited public "The Man Repeller," could face in an 
figure, or a private figure. The second imagined defamation suit. 
obstacle they face is that under classic II. Does the Average User of Social 
Media Open Themselves to 
71 
Liability for Defamatory 
Statements Made on the Internet? 
In recent years, an increasing number 
of people are using social media platforms.1 
Today, there are over 2.3 billion active 
social media users worldwide. 2 The number 
of worldwide users is expected to increase to 
2.95 billion by 2020. 3 In the United States, 
60% of the population has a social media 
account; in fact, the United States has the 
fastest growing use of social media 
worldwide. 4 Further, in the United States, 
even if someone does not have a social 
media account such as Twitter, Instagram, 
Snapchat, or Facebook, more often than not, 
they at least have a social media 
professional networking account, such as 
Linkedin. 5 In 2014, there was a 333% 
increase in social media defamation cases in 
the U.K. alone; however, this rise was only 
from 6 to 26, showing that defamation 
lawsuits may be difficult to bring for the 
average individual. 6 In the United States, 
most social media cases seem to take the 
form of cyberbullying; in fact, in 2015, it 
was reported that approximately 52% of 
adolescents have experienced cyberbullying 
according to the Department of Health and 
Human Services, Bureau of Justice Statistics 
and Research Center. 7 
Traditionally, publishers such as 
magazines and newspapers were defendants 
in defamation cases, not the average 
citizen. 8 Today, with the Internet, the 
potential reach of one post is infinite, and to 
make matters worse, it can be further shared 
by anyone who views the original 
publication. 9 As a result, a defamation case 
could be very damaging to a person's 
reputation due to the potential reach; 
however, the amount a person can recover is 
drastically limited by Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act ("CDA").10 
Also problematic, the Internet provides 
laymen, who are not well-versed in the law, 
a platform to open themselves to lawsuits-
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and they are likely ill-equipped to defend world, there is a different standard for 
themselves. 11 proving defamation cases if the plaintiff is a 
The Internet provides a platform for private individual, public figure, limited 
anyone to publish his/her own speech, public figure, or public official. The 
thoughts, talents, and ideas. One no longer Supreme Court has established a test for 
needs a formal publisher's assistance to put determining which label applies to each 
forth their work; one can simply self-publish individual plaintiff, but this test was 
using a social media or blog platform. developed in 1974 in the context of 
Today, a new commerce of attention exists newspapers and physical print. This test is 
in these social media platforms. Social no longer appropriate in the virtual world. 
media personas now have the opportunity to An Internet blogger or Instagram persona 
make money with their posts if their social files (collectively referred to as "Internet 
media feeds garner enough attention. personas") a defamation lawsuit against one 
Cooking bloggers now have hard copy, of these trolls, what are the legal 
published cookbooks, all as a result of their implications? Are Internet personas, who 
Internet attention. Fashion bloggers have are well known in certain fields, considered 
transitioned themselves into mainstream limited public figures? In order to answer 
fashion. these questions, which are addressed below, 
While the Internet fosters a lot of it will be important to look at methods in 
ingenuity and creativity, it can also produce which Internet personas attempt to achieve 
negativity. Many Instagram personas and notoriety. 
Internet bloggers have been attacked by III. Historical Background of 
Defamation Cases 
Internet trolls. 12 In the brick and mortar 
A. Defamation Defined 
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Defamation is a false statement that 
causes damage to a person's reputation. 13 
While different jurisdictions have varying 
elements necessary to prove defamation, in 
general, a plaintiff must prove: 
(a) a false and defamatory 
statement concerning 
another; 
(b) an unprivileged 
publication to a third party; 
( c) fault amounting at least to 
negligence on the part of the 
publisher; and 
( d) either actionability of the 
statement irrespective of 
special harm or the 
existence of special harm 
caused by the publication. 14 
Defenses against defamation include 
statements that are true, 15 express one's 
opinion, 16 or are made with consent, 
invitation, or request. 17 When analyzing a 
defamation claim, it is essential to 
categorize the plaintiff as a public figure, 
limited public figure, public official, or 
private person, as there is a different 
standard of proof for each. 18 
B. Establishing Different 
Standards of Proof for 
Different Categories of 
Plaintiffs in Defamation Law 
In 1964, in New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 19 the Supreme Court looked at the 
interplay between constitutional protections 
for speech and press, and a state's ability to 
award damages to a public official in a libel 
action. 20 The action arose out of statements 
allegedly made about L.B. Sullivan, the 
Commissioner of Public Affairs in 
Montgomery Alabama who oversaw the 
police, in a full-page advertisement in the 
New York Times on March 29, 1960. 21 The 
alleged libelous statements, which Sullivan 
claimed referred to him, actually referenced 
the police, and not him by name. 22 
However, Sullivan, as Police Commissioner, 
believed that the advertisement contained 
false statements about the police, and by 
extension, the Commissioner himself. 23 
Sullivan alleges that even though neither 
statement referred to him by name, it 
referred to the police who were accused of 
"ringing" the campus police and padlocking 
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the dining hall in response to the protest of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.' s arrests. 24 The 
Supreme Court admitted that some of the 
statements made with respect to the events, 
which occurred in Montgomery, were 
inaccurate. 25 Further, three of Dr. King's 
four arrests took place before the 
Commissioner was even in office. 26 Neither 
the individuals who paid for advertisement 
space, nor the New York Times checked the 
accuracy of the statements made. 27 
While Sullivan involves a civil 
action where the defendant is a publisher 
and not a state actor, it still implicates First 
Amendment protections and thus provides a 
Constitutional defense to defamation 
actions. 28 Further, Sullivan is a public 
official and the Supreme Court recognized 
the importance of establishing a wide-open 
space for critique and debate on public 
issues. 29 The Court held that Sullivan, as a 
public official, was only able to recover 
from a defamatory statement involving his 
public duty if he could prove that the 
statement was made "with 'actual malice'-
that is, with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not." 30 The reason for a higher 
standard for public officials is that there is a 
legitimate governmental interest in 
protecting the public's freedom to criticize 
public officials, and this outweighs the 
officials' interests when the statements deal 
with their public duties. 31 
The Supreme Court first discussed 
whether Sullivan applied to public figures 
(in addition to public officials) in the 1967 
decisions of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts 
and its companion case Associated Press v. 
Walker. 32 In Curtis, Curtis Publishing Co. 
("Curtis") published an article entitled "the 
Story of a College Football Fix" stating that 
Butts, an athletic director of the University 
of Georgia, gave his playbook to the 
University of Alabama head coach before 
the big game, which Curtis claimed was 
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inadvertent! y overheard by a third party. 33 
In Associated Press, a news dispatch 
gave an eyewitness account of a massive riot 
as a result of an effort to enforce a recent 
order to enroll a black student, James 
Meredith, claiming that Walker, a private 
citizen at the time of the riot/publication, 
had incited the riot. 34 The Supreme Court 
concluded that both Walker and Butts 
enjoyed a substantial amount of attention at 
the time of the publications and the subject 
of the publications served the public 
interest. 35 The Court held that Walker, 
under this standard, was not entitled to 
compensation due to the necessity to 
immediately disseminate the information. 36 
However, the Court concluded that Butts 
was entitled to compensation because there 
was no need to rush the publication of the 
defamatory statements about Butts and no 
attempt was made to see if the information 
was accurate. 37 
In 1974, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., the Court expanded on the distinctions 
outlined in Sullivan, Curtis, and Associated 
Press by further establishing a higher 
standard of proof for not only public 
officials and public figures, but also for 
limited public figures, along with a lower 
standard for private individuals. 38 Elmer 
Gertz was an attorney who represented the 
Nelson family in a civil suit against a police 
officer, Officer Nuccio, who murdered their 
son. 39 Robert Welch, Inc., publisher of 
American Opinion, which outlines views of 
the John Birch Society, published an article 
about the officer's criminal murder trial 
entitled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio and 
the War on Police," which "portrayed 
[Gertz] as an architect of the 'frame-up."'40 
The article further stated that Gertz 
was an official of the Marxist League for 
Industrial Democracy, a Leninist, a 
Communist-fronter, a criminal, and an 
officer of the National Lawyers Guild. 41 
The evidence proved quite the opposite: not 
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only was Gertz not affiliated with Marxist 
League for Industrial Democracy, but he did 
not have a criminal record, there was no 
evidence he was planning an attack, and, 
further, he never even spoke to the press 
about the matter. 42 Gertz sued for libel, 
stating that the article included false 
statements that "injured his reputation as a 
lawyer and a citizen." 43 But the court found 
no evidence that the managing editor of 
American Opinion knew of the falsity of the 
statements. 44 On review, the Supreme Court 
affirmed and stated that the lower court 
correctly determined that mere proof of 
failure to investigate cannot alone establish 
reckless disregard for the truth. 45 
In Gertz, the Supreme Court 
reiterated the holding in Sullivan that there 
is no constitutional value in false statements 
of fact, since"[ n ]either the intentional lie 
nor the careless error materially advances 
society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open' debate on public issues."46 The 
Supreme Court further discussed that while 
there is no societal value in false statements, 
it is inevitable in free debate. 47 The Court 
defined a public person as someone "by 
reason of notoriety of their achievements or 
the vigor and success with which they seek 
the public's attention." 48 The purpose for 
this distinction between public figures, 
public officials, and private citizens was 
because public figures and public officials 
have greater resources to improve their 
reputations, and thus the state interest in 
protecting public figures' and public 
officials' reputations is lower. 49 This 
triggered the emergence of the requirement 
to prove actual malice by clear and 
convincing evidence. 5o 
Private individuals, unlike public 
officials and public figures, do not 
purposefully thrust themselves into the 
public sphere, which comes with a certain 
acceptance of the possibility of scrutiny. 51 
The Court stressed that private individuals 
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should enjoy a lower standard of proof for 
defamation than the standard outlined in 
Sullivan; a private individual-plaintiff need 
only prove that the statements were made 
with either a knowledge of falsity or a 
reckless disregard for the truth. 52 Here, 
Gertz was not a public figure for all 
purposes and contexts, rather he voluntarily 
only inserted himself in the public sphere 
merely in the context of being an active 
member of the community and in his 
professional affairs, such as being an officer 
of local groups and professional 
organizations, and published articles and 
books on legal topics. 53 Additionally, while 
he was well known in some aspects of the 
community, he was not a generally known 
individual. 54 The Court was unwilling to 
characterize Gertz as a general public figure, 
and at best he could qualify as a limited 
public figure. 55 But even in this context, the 
Court concluded that he did not qualify 
because he did not actively participate in the 
criminal proceedings of Officer Nuccio, and 
he never discussed either the criminal or 
civil proceedings with the press. 56 
Therefore, he only had to prove that Robert 
Welch, Inc. either published the article with 
knowing it was false, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth. 57 
c. The Importance of Opinion 
and Public Concern in Defamation Cases 
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the Supreme 
Court clarified that a private figure needed 
to only show negligence to recover in 
defamation cases as long as the matter did 
not involve public concern. 58 Dun & 
Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, issued 
a false report, which misrepresented assets 
and liabilities held by Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc. 59 Greenmoss Builders, Inc. called and 
requested a correction when it learned of the 
error, but Dun & Bradstreet refused. 60 The 
case went up to the Supreme Court, which 
reasoned that there is a reduced value placed 
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on speech that is purely private in nature, 
resulting in less constitutional protection and 
a greater state interest in protecting 
individuals in their private affairs. 61 
The Dun Court further explained that 
the purpose of the protection under the First 
Amendment was to protect the exchange of 
ideas in order to encourage social and 
political change. 62 When there is no threat 
to free public debate, challenges to the 
government, or censorship of the press, the 
protection over the speech is less strict. 63 If 
the alleged defamatory statements are made 
about a private figure involving a matter of 
public concern, then actual malice could be 
required; however, if the statements about a 
private figure are solely about private 
matters there is less constitutional 
protection. 64 
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 
the Supreme Court clarified the opinion 
defense to allegedly defamatory 
statements. 65 Michael Milkovich, a high 
school wrestling coach, testified during a 
suit, which ultimately overturned a ruling by 
the Ohio High School Athletic Association, 
causing his entire team to be on probation 
following an altercation. 66 Lorain Journal 
Company ("Lorain") published an article in 
Theodore Diadiun' s column "TD says" 
implying that Milkovich perjured himself at 
the court proceeding. 67 Milkovich brought 
suit and alleged that by implying that he 
committed the crime of perjury, Lorain 
damaged his professional reputation as a 
teacher and coach. 68 Lorain argued, and the 
Ohio Supreme Court agreed, that the column 
was constitutionally protected opinion, and 
that this was clear by the caption, which 
read "TD Says," which clearly indicated that 
it was merely Diadiun' s opinion. 69 
Additionally it was on a sports page, which 
they argued was traditionally an outlet for 
hyperbolic speech. 70 
Overruling the Ohio Supreme Court, 
Milkovich held that an opinion can imply a 
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statement of fact and thus is not always 
protected by First Amendment privilege. 71 
Specifically, there was an implication in 
Diadiun' s statement that could be proved 
either true or false pertaining to whether or 
not Milkovich perjured himself, thus the 
statement could not be protected under the 
Constitution. 72 The Court refused to 
establish a requirement in every defamation 
case to first determine a threshold issue as to 
whether a statement is that of an opinion or 
that of a fact. 73 But in clarifying the 
Supreme Court's discussion in Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 74 the Milkovich 
Court explained that a statement on matters 
of public concern in a defamation suit must 
be provable as false before you establish 
liability in situations where the defendant is 
a media provider. 75 This means that a 
statement relating to opinion regarding 
matters that are of public concern, that do 
not contain a provable false fact, is protected 
under the Constitution. 76 
IV. Exploring Challenges Facing 
Internet Personas 
A. First Challenge: Classifj;ing 
Internet Personas 
1. Attention Economy and 
Internet Personas 
Today, social media has become a 
platform for individuals to self-publish and 
to become entrepreneurs in a way that no 
other generation has been capable of doing. 
Further, one of the most important 
commodities today is other people's 
attention; the Internet, especially social 
media, has provided users the opportunity to 
grab attention and to mold their ability to 
gamer attention, and then transform that 
attention into a career. 77 Attention Economy 
is the commodity of seeking out attention. 78 
While a lot oflntemet use is on an inter-
personal level, many Internet users gain 
notoriety, and many even seek notoriety, 
through the use of these platforms. 79 Internet 
personas gain an audience through various 
methods, including push and pull methods. 80 
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In the pull method, the audience seeks out of its development. 86 In 2013, eMarketer87 
media and ultimately finds the content estimated that companies would spend more 
providing user. The audience forms when than $9 million dollars that year in social 
their search results in their signing up for media advertising and marketing. 88 Further, 
blog updates or "follow" or "friend" the eMarketer estimated that a 10.5% annual 
content providing Internet user. 81 The pull growth could continue through 2017. 89 
method may be successful for those who RBC Capital Markets and Advertising Age 
already have a somewhat established found in September 2016, that 30% of 
following, but it is not likely the best businesses that responded to their poll, 
method for new users to obtain an advertised on Instagram, an increase from 
audience. 82 For instance, a blogger may use the 27% recorded from a survey conducted 
search term optimization, which uses key in February 2016. 90 It was also reported that 
words to drive traffic to their blogs. 83 More the amount spent by Nanigans's91 customers 
effective, however, is the push method, increased by 29% from February to April of 
where the Internet persona actively seeks the 2016. 92 Internet personas, sometimes called 
audience through advertisement or by "life style bloggers," have started 
soliciting views, 'follow,' or 'friend' capitalizing on businesses' desires to 
requests. 84 Ordinarily, an Internet persona advertise on blogs and social media, and 
will implement both push and pull methods some have created very successful careers as 
in an effort to establish an audience. 85 a result. 93 
Online advertisement and marketing 
has been an important function of social 
media, even as early as the beginning stages 2. Blogging as a Business: 
Employing Methods of Attention Economy 
81 
to Transform Internet channeling their blogs into a career. 100 This 
Blogging into a Money Machine 
inspired F erragni and Pozzoli to create the 
Harvard Business School recently 
Blonde Salad "organized around the 
explored the business model of Chiara 
different ingredients of the golden-haired 
Ferragni,94 a fashion blogger of the world 
Ferragni's salad of interests: fashion, 
famous blog "The Blonde Salad," as a case 
photography, travel and lifestyle."101 
study for the Harvard Business School MBA 
Pozzoli, who was a finance student at 
program. 95 Ferragni, while still in school, 
Bocconi and moved to Chicago to intern, 
began posting pictures of her 'outfit of the 
advised Ferragni to post a daily entry at 
day'. 96 Riccardo Pozzoli, her boyfriend and 
9AM to establish loyalty amongst her 
co-founder, recalled that her posts always 
followers. 102 By posting at 9AM every 
seemed to garner reactions, and each day 
morning, F erragni was becoming part of 
gained popularity. 97 Further, Pozzoli notes 
people's daily breakfast routine, and after a 
that although Flickr was a professional 
month she had 30,000 visitors daily.103 
photography site, Ferragni was receiving ten 
Three months after starting her blog, 
times the comments that a professional 
Ferragni was invited to Milan Fashion 
photographer would receive. 98 Pozzoli and 
Week, a rare opportunity, and possibly one 
Ferragni realized that by merely posting her 
of the first such opportunities extended to a 
'outfit of the day', she was engaging 
fashion blogger. 104 In fact, once journalists 
people. 99 
realized that a fashion blogger was present 
F erragni started to realize that 
at the show, they started interviewing her. 10s 
bloggers in the United States, such as Tevi 
While F erragni was offered a few 
Gevinson (StyleRookie.com) and Michele 
jobs on Italian television shortly after 
Phan (makeup tutorial blogger) were 
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attending her first fashion week, she turned 
them down because she and Pozzoli "knew 
that if [they] wanted to work in fashion, 
[they] could not sell Chiara as a show 
girl."106 They decided to concentrate their 
efforts on building international awareness, 
and even sought invitations from fashion 
weeks in New York, Paris, London, and 
Stockholm so that Ferragni could post about 
the new trends in each of these cities. 107 In 
2011, Ferragni and Pozzoli decided to tum 
the Blonde Salad into their full-time jobs, 
and in order to increase their daily visits 
even further, they decided to hire an Italian 
digital strategy agency to update the 
appearance of the website and create a 
mobile version. 108 Additionally, they signed 
a contract with an advertising company, 
which specialized in marketing in Italy. 109 
In the beginning, most of their 
business came from selling advertisement 
banners on the blog, but then they realized 
that product placement and content 
engagement would be even more 
lucrative. 11° F erragni would post stories 
about her day and/or her travels and would 
show a photograph of the outfit she was 
wearing and provide a link to the brand's 
website. 111 These methods successfully in 
provided The Blonde Salad with 
partnerships with Burberry, Dior, and Louis 
Vuitton, just to name a few. 112 Ferragni 
started to become a celebrity herself, and 
was invited to attend events for which she 
requested fees between $30,000 and $50,000 
for her appearance. 113 F erragni now has her 
own line of shoes, which she advertises 
nearly exclusively on the blog. 114 In mid-
2013, the duo noticed that the blog's daily 
views of 140,000 were starting to slowly 
decline due to the increased popularity of 
Instagram, and they decided to sync her 
personal Instagram account with the blog' s 
contents. 115 Soon after, she reached 2 
million followers in 2013, and 3 million in 
2014-numbers she had never reached 
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previously .116 
Similar to Ferragni's experience, 
Leandra Medine of "The Manrepeller" 
transformed her personal passion project 
into a successful business. 117 In 2011, when 
Medine was in college, she started writing a 
blog about women like herself, who dressed 
for themselves and not for men. She titled 
one of her blog posts as "stuff that men 
don't like." 118 Five years later, her blog is a 
successful business that employs a 
marketing and sales team to help her find 
sponsors for posts. 119 Medine establishes 
loyalty with her followers by focusing on 
transparency; she believes that people value 
authenticity, so she is honest when a post is 
sponsored, and does not aim to "trick" her 
followers. 120 While Medine allows brands 
to view her content collaboration posts prior 
to them being posted, she maintains her 
creative freedom, and frequently says "no" 
to companies that do not fit her brand. 121 In 
addition to content collaborations, 
Manrepeller has banner advertisements; like 
F erragni, however, Medine notes that these 
are not as lucrative as content 
collaborations. 122 While Manrepeller posts 
are often paid, they are only brands that 
Medine and her company are truly excited 
about; Medine and her co-writer Amelia 
Diamond, are very clear that they do not 
write paid reviews, but will post stories 
about brands they truly care about.123 
Medine, like Ferragni, has also been invited 
to fashion week and posts blogs reporting on 
the upcoming trends. 124 Both F erragni and 
Medine, were able to use the theories of 
attention economy to establish successful 
businesses through the use of blogs and 
Instagram. 
B. Second Obstacle: Opinion 
Defense 
Due to their notoriety, Internet 
personas such as Medine and F erragni are 
susceptible to being defamed, harassed, and 
publically ridiculed by individuals known as 
Internet "trolls."125 Internet trolls take 
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advantage of the anonymity and lack of 
face-to-face interaction provided by the 
Internet in order to post cruel comments 
about bloggers and social media 
personalities. 126 Bloggers are harassed and 
defamed online, and in particular, many 
have are body-shamed or criticized for their 
appearance. 127 These Internet trolls feel 
empowered by the veil of the Internet and 
brazenly criticize by offering their unwanted 
and unsolicited "opinions."128 As discussed 
above, opinions are considered a defense in 
defamation cases. 129 Under current law, an 
Internet troll's opinion would be protected 
as long as it did not include or imply a false 
fact. 130 This protection was initially 
provided for matters that were considered 
public concern such as opinions made about 
our government or governmental leaders.131 
Internet trolls are being protected when their 
comments are not a matter of public concern 
simply because comments about someone's 
looks are not false facts and are "merely 
opinion."132 
C. Third Obstacle: Section 230 
Immunity to Internet Service 
Providers 
In order to file a defamation case, 
Medine and Ferragni would be faced with 
many challenges, including incurring 
significant costs, without the ability to 
recover significant monetary damages, since 
they are unable to sue the Internet service 
provider and only the poster of the 
defamatory statement. 133 Internet service 
providers (websites and social media 
providers) are immune from defamation 
suits under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act ("CDA").134 
Unlike in the physical print media world, in 
Internet defamation cases, plaintiffs cannot 
seek damages from the publisher. 135 In fact, 
Section 230 specifically immunizes Internet 
service providers from civil liability: 
(c) Protection for "Good 
Samaritan" blocking and screening of 
offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or 
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speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content 
provider. 
(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be held liable on 
account of--
(A) any action voluntarily taken in 
good faith to restrict access to or availability 
of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; 
or 
(B) any action taken to enable or 
make available to information content 
providers or others the technical means to 
restrict access to material described in 
paragraph (I )136 
Section 230's protection oflnternet service 
providers from civil liability regarding posts 
made by third parties severely limits the 
monetary damages available to a blogger or 
social media user in the United States, and, 
as a result, the United States offers little 
protection to those defamed on the 
Internet. 137 
In Zeran v. America Online, Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit first examined the CDA as a defense 
to defamation law. 138 Kenneth Zeran 
brought an action against America Online, 
Inc. ("AOL") arguing that it unreasonably 
delayed removing defamatory messages 
posted by an anonymous third party, 
neglected to screen for additional posts, and 
refused to post retractions. 139 Zeran not only 
received a high volume of phone calls, but 
also death threats as a result of this posting. 
140 Affirming the lower court, the Seventh 
Circuit held that Section 230 of the CDA 
provides Internet service providers 
protection from liability. They cannot be 
treated as publishers of the content in the 
same way that a newspaper is considered a 
publisher in print media. 141 The court 
explained that the purpose of the CDA' s 
protection for Internet service providers is to 
encourage and maintain online discourse 
and competition in the free market, free 
from federal and state regulation. 142 The 
court further held that Section 230 
eliminates both publisher and distributer 
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liability, since distributers are also 
considered publishers according to 
defamation law. 143 Publishing the statement 
is a necessary element in defamation law, so 
only one who publishes such statements are 
liable for defamation.144 
Without the protections provided by 
Section 230, Internet service providers 
would potentially be subject to liability for 
every defamatory statement made on their 
sites. 145 Each post would subject the 
provider to an investigation if the posting 
party made a defamatory remark; this, in 
tum, could cause a "chilling effect," and 
discourage new Internet service providers 
from entering the marketplace. 146 The court 
recognized that Zeran had only sued AOL 
because the individual poster was 
anonymous, and only AOL had the ability to 
locate this individual.147 
While on the Internet anyone can 
become a "publisher" of content, the Society 
of Professional Journalists has a code of 
ethics, which, while not legally enforceable, 
is a standard followed by thousands of 
j oumali sts. 148 This code encourages 
journalists to avoid stereotyping individuals 
based on race, age, gender, religion, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, physical 
appearance, and so forth. 149 Further, the 
code states that "[e]thical journalists treat 
sources, subjects, and colleagues as human 
beings deserving of respect," thus, 
recognizing a person's right to their privacy 
and stating that journalists should use good 
taste and "[a]void pandering to lurid 
curiosity."150 While most journalists follow 
a code of ethics, posters on social media do 
not follow any standards of ethics, moral, or 
otherwise. 
V. Analysis of the Obstacles Facing 
Internet Personas and Why 
Revision to Defamation Law is 
Necessary in the Current Climate 
of the Internet 
Bloggers and social media 
personalities face many obstacles if they try 
to sue posters of harassing and cruel 
comments made about them on the Internet. 
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The first obstacle for social media providers 
is determining whether they qualify as a 
public figure, a limited public figure, or a 
private figure. 151 The second obstacle they 
face is that, under classic defamation law, an 
opinion is a defense to defamation. 152 The 
third obstacle they face is that they cannot 
sue the Internet service provider, which is 
provided immunity under Section 230 of the 
CDA, limiting potential recovery. 153 
A. Identifj;ing Internet Personas 
as Limited Public Figures for 
the Purpose of Defamation 
Law 
Internet personas should only be 
considered limited public figures under 
defamation law if they employ theories of 
attention economy .154 By doing so, Internet 
personas such as F erragni and Medine set 
themselves apart from recreational Internet 
users and make it clear that their intended 
use is to make money .155 In the physical, 
non-virtual world, limited public figures 
only thrust themselves into the public sphere 
for a limited purpose, usually in some 
business capacity .156 While it is not 
necessary for Internet personas to make a 
profit to become a limited public figure, the 
efforts made by F erragni and Medine to 
promote their businesses show that they are 
voluntarily entering into the public sphere, 
at the very least, for the purpose of 
promoting their businesses. 157 It seems that 
individuals like Gertz, Medine, and Ferragni 
are not public figures for all purposes and 
contexts because they voluntarily entered 
the public sphere for professional reasons 
and are not widely known. 158 While it 
seems that most bloggers would not be 
generally known public figures (since they 
are known in a limited capacity for the 
subject matter of their blogs or social media 
profiles to a selective demographic of the 
Internet users), it seems that some could 
become so famous that they become 
generally known. 159 Further complicating 
their role as limited public figures is that 
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Medine, Ferragni, and others not only 
discuss fashion, but also their day-to-day 
activities and personal lives. 160 However, 
by utilizing advertising and marketing 
techniques, they make it clear that even the 
aspects of their personal lives that they share 
are part of their overall business plan-they 
are creating an image and using their 
interests and likeability in order to create a 
sense of friendship with their followers. 161 
Lifestyle bloggers are creating a 
business by marketing themselves, and for 
that reason, the mere sharing of personal 
information about their day-to-day lives 
does not transform them from limited public 
figures into general public figures. 162 
However, this is argued with one caveat: m 
the physical, non virtual world, the 
distinction between limited public figures 
and public figures lies in distinguishing each 
group's access to media to rebuild their 
reputations following defamatory 
statements. 163 With the Internet, bloggers 
who are defamed can instantly refute any 
attacks on their reputations with a click of a 
button, which further complicates the use of 
traditional defamation law in those cases. 164 
In traditional defamation law, both 
public figures and limited public figures 
need to prove that defamatory statements 
were made with actual malice. 165 Therefore, 
if traditional defamation law is applied to 
Internet personas, Medine and F erragni 
would have to prove that the defamatory 
statements were made with actual 
knowledge that they were false or with 
reckless disregard for the truth. 166 While the 
distinction between limited public figure and 
public figure has little significance when 
defamatory statements pertain to areas into 
which the individuals voluntary thrust 
themselves, it is significant when the 
defamatory statements are made about 
aspects of their personal lives. 167 In the 
physical, non-virtual world, Medine and 
Ferragni would enjoy the lower standard of 
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proof, that of negligence, with respect to the 
truth if the statements were made about their 
personal and private life, and not, for 
instance, about their careers in fashion or 
otherwise related to one of their posts. 168 
B. Opinion Should Nat be a 
Defense in Internet 
Defamations Cases 
One of the greatest obstacles for 
Internet personas such as Medine and 
Ferragni is overcoming the opinion defense 
when making a defamation claim. 169 Under 
traditional defamation law, the alleged 
defamer was usually a professional 
publisher such as a newspaper, journal, or 
magazine, and professional journalists 
usually wrote the defamatory statements. 170 
Professional publishers are less likely to be 
careless with the truth, and while not 
required, many follow ethical rules which 
encourage journalists to not "pander to lurid 
curiosity," to respect people as human 
beings, and to not characterize individuals 
based on physical appearance, race, gender, 
weight, etc. 171 Traditionally, professional 
journalists and publishers have also had the 
pressure from society to publish articles with 
integrity. 172 By contrast, anyone online can 
publish free of such pressures. 173 Further, 
while journalists are known by name, the 
same is not true for defamers, trolls, and 
cyberbullies who can post anything without 
any repercussions due to anonymity. 174 
When suing for defamation, the most 
damaging and cruel things that are written 
about Internet personas can be characterized 
as mere opinion, and they frequently come 
from the trolls and cyberbullies who are 
difficult to identify. 175 Not only that, but 
calling someone "fat," "ugly," "stupid," and 
so forth is not something that can be proved 
in fact, and thus is typically a protected 
opinion under the rules of traditional 
defamation law. 176 The Internet allows the 
average user to become a publisher without 
being hired by a publishing company, or 
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even undergoing any sort of vetting and 
editing process-they become a publisher 
instantaneously, the moment they make a 
post, which can be made with rage, hate, 
jealously, and/or ignorance, without any 
perceived repercussions.177 
There should be no First Amendment 
protection for speech on the Internet that 
lacks value-that is, speech with the main 
purpose of hurting others-such as 
criticizing someone's physical appearance, 
nationality, race, or gender. 178 In 
determining whether statements are entitled 
to First Amendment protection in the non-
virtual world, courts weigh the interest in 
protecting the speech by determining if it is 
a statement of false facts, since there is no 
societal value in false statements made in 
reckless disregard for their veracity and/or 
false statements made with actual malice. 179 
Likewise, because there is no value in 
derogatory statements about a person's 
physical characteristics, which are matters of 
private concern, such statements should not 
be entitled to protection under the First 
Amendment. 180 
The purpose of defamation law is to 
allow individuals to not only revive their 
reputation, but to also remedy the harm, as 
well as deter others from making similar 
statements. 181 Further, the purpose behind 
the First Amendment protection for speech 
was to protect the exchange of ideas in order 
to encourage social and political change.182 
Derogatory statements about a person's 
physical characteristics should not be 
protected. 183 Because the Internet allows 
anyone to publish harmful speech, there 
needs to be some government regulation and 
protection in order to discourage reckless, 
harmful speech. 184 
C. The Communications 
Decency Act Immunizes Internet Service 
Providers from 
Liability Resulting from Third-Party 
Posts 
The CDA immunizes Internet service 
providers (including websites and social 
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media sites and applications) from liability, 
as they are not considered "publishers" of 
third-party posts, a requirement of 
defamation law. 185 Thus, if F erragni and 
Medine were to sue a third-party for 
defamatory or harassing statements, not only 
would they face the difficulty of having to 
locate an anonymous source, but the 
potential recovery is severely limited if the 
Internet service provider is given 
immunity. 186 The CDA was enacted in 
1996 with the purpose of protecting Internet 
service providers from potential liability so 
that new Internet service providers would 
not be discouraged from entering the 
marketplace in the great new world of the 
Internet. 187 While promoting Internet 
growth was an important economic and 
social concern in 1996, there is no longer the 
same need to protect Internet service 
providers today when there are currently 2.3 
billion social media users worldwide, and 
approximately 60% of United States citizens 
use social media. 188 Today, the government 
interest in promoting Internet growth should 
no longer outweigh the need for recovery 
from defamation and harassment on the 
Internet. Internet trolling has become a 
troubling and dangerous problem, which 
requires some exceptions to the blanket 
protections given to Internet service 
providers from liability from third-party 
posts. 189 
VI. Conclusion 
Traditional defamation law needs to 
be reformed in order to provide protection to 
social media personalities or bloggers on the 
Internet. If traditional defamation law is 
applied to Internet cases, a social media 
personality or blogger such as Ferragni or 
Medine would face many challenges, so 
many so that it would discourage them from 
protecting their reputations in court. 
Further, if a social media personality or 
blogger utilizes methods of attention 
economy in order to self-promote, then they 
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could be considered limited public figures 
for the purposes of defamation law. If a 
social media personality actively pursues 
notoriety, they should still be considered a 
limited public figure under a revised 
defamation law, since they have only 
willingly entered the public sphere for a 
limited purpose. However, this does not 
mean that they should be subjected to 
endless criticism and derogatory comments 
made by Internet trolls hiding behind the 
defense of opinion. There is no social utility 
in derogatory and cruel statements. 
It is inappropriate to apply an 
opinion defense, which was traditionally 
given to journalists and professional 
publishers, as there is no vetting process in 
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